Sixth Amendment--Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs by Ziegelmueller, William P.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 83
Issue 4 Winter Article 6
Winter 1993
Sixth Amendment--Due Process on Drugs: The
Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial
Detainees with Antipsychotic Drugs
William P. Ziegelmueller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
William P. Ziegelmueller, Sixth Amendment--Due Process on Drugs: The Implications of Forcibly Medicating Pretrial Detainees with
Antipsychotic Drugs, 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 836 (1992-1993)
0091-4169/93/8304-0836
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 83, No. 4
Copyright @ 1993 by Northwestern University, School of Law Pinted in U.S.A.
SIXTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS ON




Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992)
Your brain is your own. Intelligent, open collaboration can expand
your mind-with words and with drugs. Only ignorance and misinfor-
mation can allow someone else to control it-with their own words or
with their own drugs or with their imaginary fears.
-TIMOTHY LEARY, THE POLITICS OF ECSTASY 63 (1965)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Riggins v. Nevada,' the United States Supreme Court held
that a person detained for trial has a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in being free from
the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs. 2 The Court
held that Riggins was denied due process of law when Nevada com-
pelled him to take medication prior to trial without first balancing
Riggins' liberty interest against the State's interests in medicating its
detainee. 3 The Court concluded that a strong possibility existed
that this error prejudiced Riggins' trial since the effects of antip-
sychotic drugs may have impacted Riggins' outward appearance, his
testimony, and his ability to follow the proceedings and communi-
cate with his attorney.4
This Note examines the development of the liberty interest in
freedom from forced medication and the Court's extension of that
interest in Riggins v. Nevada. This Note argues that although the
Court ruled correctly, it provided little guidance as to how compet-
ing personal and state interests should be balanced in future cases.
This Note concludes that the Court's opinion should be interpreted
I Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
2 Id. at 1815.
3 Id. at 1815-16.
4 Id. at 1816.
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as requiring strict scrutiny of any governmental act which involves
the administration of unwanted antipsychotic drugs to pretrial de-
tainees. Furthermore, the Court should have required a showing of
actual prejudice, instead of merely a strong possibility of an unfair
trial, before reversing Riggins' criminal conviction.
II. BACKGROUND
Since their introduction in the 1950s, antipsychotic drugs have
become the preferred treatment for schizophrenia and other acute
and chronic psychoses. 5 These powerful mind-affecting drugs con-
tinue to pose novel questions to a legal system that is accustomed to
viewing mental competence and incompetence in absolute terms. 6
A brief review of the medical effects of antipsychotic drugs is neces-
sary before the legal implications of the drugs can be fully
understood.
A. THE EFFECTS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
Antipsychotic drugs are highly effective for treating the symp-
toms of psychoses. 7 Although the drugs do not cure psychoses, they
clear the hallucinations and delusions that may produce disruptive
behavior and interfere with other types of treatment.8 Antipsychot-
ics thus facilitate more humane treatment of patients by alleviating
the need for physical restraints and reduce institutionalization by
5 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Psychiatric Association Supporting Peti-
tioner at 6, Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (No. 90-8466) [hereinafter Brief of
American Psychiatric Association]; see also HAROLD I. KAPLAN & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, SY-
NOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 492 (5th ed. 1988).
Antipsychotic drugs are sometimes called neuroleptic drugs or major tranquilizers.
KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra, at 498. Antipsychotic drugs are a subset of psychotropic, or
mind-affecting, drugs which include antipsychotics, antidepressants, mood stabilizers,
and antianxiety agents. Id. at 493.
6 Terms such as "synthetic sanity" and "artificial competence" have developed to
describe the state induced by antipsychotic drugs. See, e.g., State v. Hampton, 218 So. 2d
311, 312 (La. 1969); cf Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Applebaum, "Mind Control," "Syn-
thetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence, " and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antip-
sychotic Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REV. 77, 78 (1983) (Antipsychotics are merely
therapeutic, not "mind-altering" or "thought-controlling.").
7 See, e.g., Donald J. Kemna, Current Status of Institutionalized Mental Health Patients'
Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 6J. LEGAL MED. 107, 109 (1985). Antipsychotic drugs
are used to treat schizophrenia, organic psychoses, and mania, as well as certain non-
psychotic mental illnesses. Id. at 109-10.
"Psychosis" is defined as "a mental disorder causing gross distortion or disorgani-
zation of a person's mental capacity, affective response, and capacity to recognize reality,
communicate, and relate to others to the degree of interfering with his capacity to cope
with the ordinary demands of everyday life." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1286
(25th ed. 1990).
8 Brief of American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 7-8.
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making it possible for the mentally ill to function in the community. 9
The maximal effects of antipsychotic drugs will generally be evident
after four to six weeks of treatment following an acute exacerbation
of a schizophrenic illness.' 0 For patients with chronic psychosis,
maintenance doses of antipsychotic medication may be adminis-
tered indefinitely to prevent future exacerbations.I Since no single
substitute can provide the advantages of antipsychotic drugs,
"[d]enying... patients the benefit of the neuroleptic action without
offering any suitable alternative may be considered a clinical er-
ror."' 12 However, the clear benefits of antipsycotic drugs must be
considered in light of their potentially serious side effects. 13
Although all available antipsychotic drugs are equally effective
in treating schizophrenia and have the same set of possible side ef-
fects, the potency of individual compounds varies widely. 14 For ex-
ample, Mellaril, the drug at issue in Riggins v. Nevada, and Thorazine
are the least potent antipsychotics.' 5 Recommended adult doses for
these drugs is 200-400 milligrams per day,' 6 although physicians
generally prescribe a lower dose initially and increase it as needed. 17
The maximum daily dose is 800 milligrams.' 8 Highly potent antip-
sychotics such as Prolixin and Haldol require much smaller doses to
attain the same effects. 19 Even when properly prescribed, all antip-
9 See Kemna, supra note 7, at 110.
10 See, e.g., KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 503. An exacerbation is an "increase in
the severity of a disease or any of its signs or symptoms." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY, supra note 7, at 546. Improvement may continue beyond the four to six week inter-
val. Brief of American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 7.
11 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 503-04. Dosage will generally be reduced in
the maintenance stage, beginning about six months after the initial improvement follow-
ing an acute exacerbation. Id.
12 Dilip V. Jeste & Richard J. Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dyskinesia: An
Overview, 138 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 297, 306 (198 1).
13 Kemna, supra note 7, at 111. See infra notes 14-39 and accompanying text.
14 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 500. Most courts and commentators speak
in general about antipsychotic drugs and neglect the distinctions between the various
antipsychotic agents. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 214 n.1 (1990)
(holding applies to all antipsychotic drugs); Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1812
(1992) (same); Steve Tomashefsky, Comment, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand
Trial: The Right of the Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 773 n.3 (1985). A
focus on the possible effects of antipsychotic drugs in general should not replace a focus
on the actual effects of the specific drugs(s) involved in a given case. See infra part V.
15 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 500-02. Thorazine is the trade name for chlor-
promazine, the first antipsychotic drug to be introduced. Id. at 492. Mellaril is the trade
name for thioridazine. Id. at 502.
16 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 502 tbl. 2.
17 Id. at 503.
18 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2013 (46th ed. 1992).
19 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 502 tbl. 2. Prolixin is the trade name for
fluphenazine; Haldol, for haloperidol. Id. To determine potency, drugs are generally
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sychotic drugs can cause both neurological and non-neurological
side effects. 20 However, "one generalization about the adverse ef-
fects from antipsychotics is that low-potency drugs [like Mellaril]
cause more non-neurological adverse effects and that high-potency
drugs cause more neurological adverse effects." 21
One of the common non-neurological side effects of antip-
sychotic drugs is sedation or somnolence. 22 Sedation can be
avoided by giving the entire daily dose at bedtime until the patient
develops a tolerance to the sedative effect of the drug.23 Orthostatic
hypotension, which causes fainting and falling, also generally occurs
at the onset of antipsychotic treatment before the patient develops a
tolerance for the drugs. 24 Other possible non-neurological side ef-
fects include decreased libido in both sexes and impotence in males;
peripheral anticholinergic effects such as dry mouth, constipation,
urinary retention, nausea, and vomiting; central anticholinergic ef-
fects such as agitation, disorientation, hallucinations, seizures, and
coma; retinal pigmentation which may result in blindness; agranulo-
cytosis, a potentially fatal blood condition; lethal cardiotoxicity; al-
lergic dermatitis; and weight gain.25 Many of these effects can be
controlled by reducing dosages, adding other medicine, or changing
to a different antipsychotic drug.26 These side effects generally
cease when the drugs are discontinued, although chronically ill pa-
tients on maintenance doses of antipsychotic drugs may suffer per-
manent side effects. 27
Neurological side effects include dystonias, parkinsonian symp-
toms, akathisia, tardive dyskinesia, neuroleptic malignant syndrome,
and seizures. 28 Dystonic movements involve muscle spasms in the
eyes, neck, face, tongue, and arms. 29 Parkinsonian symptoms in-
compared to 100 milligrams of Thorazine; for example, less than 5 milligrams of
Prolixin is as efficacious as 100 milligrams ofThorazine. Id. There are numerous other
antipsychotic compounds with potencies between these extremes. Id.
20 See Brief of American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 8; KAPLAN & SADOCK,
supra note 5, at 504-08.
21 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 504.
22 Kemna, supra note 7, at 11I. Sedation is a calming effect, whereas somnolence is a
condition of drowsiness or semiconsciousness. See STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 7, at 1399, 1486.
23 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 504-05.
24 Id. at 505.
25 Id. at 504-06.
26 See generally Brief of American Psychiatric Association, supra note 5, at 8; Alexander
D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 179, 186 (1980).
27 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 26, at 186-87.
28 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 506-08.
29 Kemna, supra note 7, at 112.
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clude muscle stiffness, stooped posture, a mask-like face, tremors,
and drooling.30 Akathisia is muscular discomfort that causes rest-
lessness and agitation.3 l Both dystonic and parkinsonian effects oc-
cur relatively often, although less so when Mellaril is used.3 2 Other
drugs may be used to treat the symptoms of these side effects until a
patient develops a tolerance to the antipsychotic. 3 3 Even when the
adverse effects persist, they are not particularly serious and can be
eliminated by reducing the dosage or ceasing antipsychotic
medication.3 4
The remaining neurological effects are of greater concern, how-
ever. Tardive dyskinesia causes abnormal and involuntary move-
ments of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw, and extremities.3 5 "Both the
risk of developing [tardive dyskinesia] and the likelihood that it will
become irreversible are believed to increase as the duration of treat-
ment and the total cumulative dose of neuroleptic drugs adminis-
tered to the patient increase."3 6 There is no known treatment for
tardive dyskinesia; prevention is best achieved by minimizing dos-
ages.3 7 Neuroleptic malignant syndrome is a potentially fatal side
effect manifested by elevated fever and pulse, muscular rigidity, and
altered mental states that requires the immediate discontinuation of
antipsychotic drugs and intensive medical treatment.3 8 Finally, the
risk of seizure must be considered when medicating patients who
are susceptible to seizures.3 9
The extraordinary mind-affecting benefits of antipsychotic
drugs, as well as their potentially devastating side effects, are of
greatest concern when the drugs are administered without a pa-
tient's consent. The forcible administration of these powerful drugs
intrudes on a person's bodily autonomy and, hence, presents impor-
tant legal issues.
30 Id.
31 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 507.
32 Id. at 506-07. Approximately ten percent of patients will suffer from dystonias;
parkinsonian effects are slightly more common. Id. These effects generally occur soon
after treatment begins. Id.
33 See KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 506-07. In some cases, akathisia cannot be
treated and dosages must be reduced or eliminated. Id. at 507; see also Kemna, supra note
7, at 112 n.34.
34 See, e.g., Kemna, supra note 7, at 112.
35 Id. at 113.
36 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 18, at 2012. Fifty to sixty percent of
chronically institutionalized patients suffer from tardive dyskinesia. KAPLAN & SADOCK,
supra note 5, at 507.
37 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 507.
38 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 18, at 2012.
39 KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 5, at 506.
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B. JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
its a state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 40 This Clause protects those liberties
that are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental. ' 41 The Fourteenth Amendment thus
incorporates and applies to the states those provisions of the Bill of
Rights which prevent federal encroachment on basic rights.42 The
due process guarantee, however, is not limited to freedoms enumer-
ated in the Constitution; rather, it applies to all freedoms "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty."' 43 To apply the Due Process
Clause, then, the Supreme Court must first decide whether an as-
serted interest falls within the scope of the Clause before determin-
ing whether that right was adequately protected.44 To determine
whether a substantive right was unjustly violated, due process re-
quires the Court to balance "the liberty of the individual" against
"the demands of an organized society." 45 Both the substantive free-
doms recognized by the Due Process Clause and the specific Sixth
Amendment rights incorporated by the Clause are of import here.
40 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see also Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
42 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2804 (1992) (Due Process Clause incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the
states). The first ten amendments were initially held to restrict only the federal govern-
ment. Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
When the Fourteenth Amendment was passed to prevent the states from restricting indi-
vidual rights, the provisions of the Bill of Rights were selectively incorporated into the
Due Process Clause to prevent their infringement by states, as well as the federal gov-
ernment. See generally CRAIG R. DUCAT & HAROLD W. CHASE, CONSTrruTONAL INTERPRE-
TATION 841-46 (4th ed. 1988) (list of incorporated provisions of Bill of Rights and
relevant cases). For a brief discussion of the process of incorporation, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ II-I to -4 (2d ed. 1988).
43 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). See also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805
(substantive liberty interests protected by Fourteenth Amendment are not limited to Bill
of Rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (Stewart,J., concurring) (same). Cf
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2576 (1992) (quoting Dowling v. United States,
493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)) (since Bill of Rights specifically provides for many aspects of
criminal procedure, Due Process Clause "has limited operation" beyond incorporating
Bill of Rights).
44 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982) ("the substantive issue involves
a definition of that protected constitutional interest, as well as identification of the con-
ditions under which competing state interests might outweigh it"); Youngberg v. Ro-
meo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (same).
45 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,
J., dissenting)); see also, e.g., Mills, 457 U.S. at 299.
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1. Substantive Due Process Implications
The Supreme Court has recognized a significant liberty interest
in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs
under the Due Process Clause.4 6 In Washington v. Harper, the Court
concluded that "the forcible injection of medication into a noncon-
senting person's body represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty."' 47 Harper involved a schizophrenic prisoner with a
history of violence.4 8 The State of Washington sought to administer
antipsychotics against Harper's will, pursuant to a prison policy that
allowed forced medication in certain circumstances. 49 In defining
46 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990).
Prior to Harper, the Supreme Court assumed, but did not decide, that "the Constitu-
tion recognizes a liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antip-
sychotic drugs." Mills, 457 U.S. at 299. Both the trial court and the court of appeals in
Mills held that such a right is protected by the Due Process Clause. Rogers v. Okin, 478
F. Supp. 1342, 1366 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in relevant part, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (Ist Cir.
1980). Before the Supreme Court could rule in Mills, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs could be outweighed
only by "an overwhelming state interest." In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51
(Mass. 1981). Since "[s]tate law may recognize liberty interests more extensive than
those independently protected by the Federal Constitution," Mills, 457 U.S. at 300, the
Court remanded the case for consideration in light of Roe. Id. at 306.
Before Harper, several courts interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Rogers as a
tacit approval of a liberty interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. See,
e.g., United States v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 976-77 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted in part,
vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied
sub nom. Watson v. United States, 497 U.S. 1006 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387,
1392 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985). Other courts recognized such
an interest without relying on Mills. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479,
490-92 (4th Cir. 1984) (unwanted antipsychotic medication implicates constitutional
rights of incompetent accused), rev'd on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Johnson v. Silvers, 742 F.2d 823, 824-25 (4th Cir. 1984) (un-
wanted antipsychotic medication implicates constitutional rights of involuntarily com-
mitted mental patient); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 1981) (unwanted
antipsychotic medication implicates a mental patient's constitutional rights), vacated, 458
U.S. 1119 (1982); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (unwanted
antipsychotic medication implicates constitutional rights of prisoner).
47 Harper, 494 U.S. at 229. The Supreme Court compared this intrusion to com-
pelled surgery. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (compelled surgery to
remove bullet for evidentiary purposes is substantial interference with protected liber-
ties). See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(competent person has liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
48 Harper, 494 U.S. at 214 & n.2.
49 Id. at 215 & n.3. As explained by the Court, the policy of the Special Offender
Center, in which Harper was held, was to subject an inmate to unwanted medication
only if he suffered from a mental disorder and was gravely disabled or likely to harm
himself or others. Id. The inmate was granted several procedural protections, including
a hearing before a psychiatrist, psychologist, and the associate superintendent of the
Center to decide whether medication should be compelled. Id. at 215. The inmate, with
assistance from a lay advisor, could present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine
staff witnesses. Id. If a majority of the committee, including the psychiatrist, voted to
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Harper's liberty interest, the Supreme Court extensively reviewed
the effects of antipsychotic drugs and concluded that "the drugs can
have serious, even fatal, side effects."'50
The Court ruled against Harper, however, because his admit-
tedly substantial interest in avoiding forced medication was out-
weighed by the state's interests in prescribing antipsychotic drugs.51
Two state interests were served by medicating Harper: the police
power interest in controlling violent behavior in prisons, and the
parens patriae duty to provide for prisoners' health and safety.52
Since "[t]here are few cases in which the State's interest in combat-
ing the danger posed by a person to both himself and others is
greater than in a prison environment,"53 the Court applied a stan-
dard of review that was deferential to the prison authorities "best
equipped to make difficult decisions regarding prison administra-
tion." 54 An intrusive prison regulation will be upheld if it is "rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological interests." 55 The Harper
Court deferred to the medical and penal experts, who decided to
medicate Harper since antipsychotic medicine was both reasonably
related to the security of the prison and the appropriate medical
treatment for Harper's disorder. 56
Although the Harper holding was limited by its facts to con-
victed prisoners, it seems reasonable to expect that unconvicted
persons detained by a state would enjoy at least as much liberty as
compel medication, such medication would proceed subject to periodic review. Id. at
215-16.
50 Id. at 229-30. The Court particularly emphasized the risk of acute dystonia, akathi-
sia, neuroleptic malignant syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia. Id. However, the majority
noted the medical uncertainty about the frequency and severity of the side effects and
emphasized the need to defer to medical judgments about the benefits of the drugs in
individual cases. Id at 230-31 n.12. See supra part II.A.
51 Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
52 Id. at 225-26. See also Jami Floyd, Comment, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs
to Prisoners: State of the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1243, 1257-59 (1990).
53 Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
54 Id. at 223-24. See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987).
55 See Harper, 494 U.S. at 223-25; Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. This deferential standard of
review applies in prison settings even when the right asserted is so fundamental that a
higher standard of review would be required in other circumstances. O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987) (prison regulations restricting free exercise of
religion subject only to reasonable relationship test). The Court outlined three factors
relevant to determining the reasonableness of a regulation: 1) a rational connection be-
tween the regulation and the governmental interest it seeks to further; 2) the impact of
the asserted right on guards, other inmates, and prison resources; 3) the absence of
ready alternatives to the regulation. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
56 Harper, 494 U.S. at 227. See supra note 49 regarding the prison procedures used to
decide whether to medicate Harper against his will.
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convicted criminals. The Court has so held.57 A state's interest in
secure facilities and healthy inmates is the same whether the inmate
is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner.58 However, since de-
tainees await trial, they arguably have greater interests at stake than
convicted prisoners, for they are adversely affected by any act which
influences the fairness of their trial.
Accordingly, in cases prior to Harper involving the forcible med-
ication of pretrial detainees, two lower courts applied a stricter stan-
dard of review than the one adopted by the Harper Court. In Bee v.
Greaves,59 the Tenth Circuit held that, absent an emergency, compel-
ling a detainee to take antipsychotic drugs is not reasonably related
to the goal of prison security.60 Under Bee, a state's interest in medi-
cating would outweigh an individual's right to refuse that medica-
tion only in a prison emergency and if the medicine was medically
appropriate and the least intrusive means available.6 '
Relying in part on Bee, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v.
Charters,62 initially refused to defer to medical professionals and held
that a competent detainee's liberty interest outweighs any govern-
mental interests in preventing violence, protecting health, and ren-
dering the accused competent to stand trial. 63 For an incompetent
detainee, the trial court would have to determine "what treatment
the patient would, if competent, select for himself," rather than de-
fer to attending medical experts.64 On rehearing, however, the
Fourth Circuit reversed Charters and held that due process is fulfilled
if the decision to medicate is based on the responsible judgment of
appropriate professionals. 65 This reversal left the circuits at odds as
to whether the decision to medicate pretrial detainees warrants
stricter scrutiny than the decision to medicate convicted prisoners.
In Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
57 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979) (pretrial detainees retain at least those
constitutional rights enjoyed by convicted prisoners). Non-criminal mental patients ob-
viously are not as subject to a state's police power as criminals, but their interests may
still be weighed against other state interests, such as parens patriae. See generally Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990).
58 Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47.
59 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
60 Id. at 1395.
61 Id. at 1395-96.
62 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd on reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
63 Id. at 484.
64 Id. If it cannot be determined what course the patient would have selected, the
court would have to act in the patient's best interest; the judgment of the experts at the
facility would not suffice. Id. at 497-98.




determine the appropriate standard of review in cases involving the
forcible medication of pretrial detainees. The Court could have
chosen to apply Harper's deferential reasonableness standard, or it
could have agreed with the Tenth Circuit that increased scrutiny is
warranted by the patient's status as a pretrial detainee. Since the
effects of antipsychotic drugs administered before trial will often lin-
ger into trial, both the State and the detainee have interests which
are not present when the rights of convicted prisoners are at issue.
Thus, in addition to the issues presented in Harper, the Riggins Court
had to consider the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
2. Sixth Amendment Implications
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused in all criminal
prosecutions the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." 66 The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "the fundamental
elements of fairness in a criminal trial" to defendants in state
courts. 67 This guarantee incorporates, but is not limited to, the
rights enumerated in the Sixth Amendment. 68
It has long been accepted that the conviction of an incompetent
defendant violates due process. 69 Competency hearings are now
held prior to trial, at which courts make two inquiries about the de-
fendant's cognitive abilities: whether a criminal defendant "has suf-
ficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'70
66 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967); see also Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (right to fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by Fourteenth
Amendment).
68 The Court selectively incorporated provisions of the Sixth Amendment into the
Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to coun-
sel); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right of confrontation); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process). Rights that are "essential to
due process of law in a fair adversary process" are protected by the Due Process Clause
even if not enumerated in the Constitution. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
& n.15 (1975).
69 See, e.g., Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572, 2574 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 171-73 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). For a general
discussion of the competency issue, see Michelle K. Bachand, Comment, Antipsychotic
Drugs and the Incompetent Defendant: A Perspective on the Treatment and Prosecution of Incompetent
Defendants, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1059, 1074-79 (1990).
70 Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per
curiam)). Accord MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1962) ("No person who as a result of
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While a determination of competency under this test is not sufficient
to prove that a defendant received a fair trial, such a determination
is necessary because the elements of a fair trial presuppose, and de-
pend upon, mental competence. 71 The rights enumerated in the
Sixth Amendment thus presume the competence of a defendant but
may, of course, be violated even if the defendant is competent.
The Sixth Amendment specifically provides that defendants
have the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense. 72 The
defendant has a right to give advice to his lawyer and make sugges-
tions regarding his defense, as well as "to supercede his lawyer alto-
gether and conduct the trial himself."73 Of course, in order to
decide whether to exercise these rights, the defendant must be able
to understand the proceedings against him,7 4 must not be excluded
from the proceedings, 75 and must not be precluded from consulting
with his attorney. 76
The Sixth Amendment also grants an accused the right to con-
front the witnesses who testify against him and to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses to assist in his defense. 77 Derived
from these rights is the due process requirement that the defendant
be allowed to testify, since he is often "the most important witness
for the defense."78 The exercise of "duress on [a] witness' mind
mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to
assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an
offense so long as such capacity endures.").
71 Blackstone wrote long ago that a "mad" offender should not be arraigned "be-
cause he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that he ought." 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24. See also Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. One could also ques-
tion whether an incompetent defendant's mind is truly "in" the courtroom even if the
defendant is physically present to defend himself. See Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2584 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting); Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th Cir. 1963). Fur-
ther, it is argued that a defendant cannot be deterred by, or understand the retributive
force of, criminal sanctions if a defendant lacks an understanding of the nature and con-
sequences of his acts. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (upholding
rule that the insane cannot be executed and discussing various rationales for the ancient
rule).
72 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See supra text accompanying note 66.
73 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (quoting Synder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934)).
74 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
75 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (one of the most basic rights is to be
present at every stage of trial).
76 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (precluding defendant from com-
municating with counsel during overnight recess violated Sixth Amendment); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (statements elicited in absence of attorney deprived
accused of right to counsel). See also Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 938 (4th
Cir. 1963) (mental, as well as physical, presence is required at trial).
77 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See supra text accompanying note 66.
78 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
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[so] as to preclude him from making a free and voluntary choice"
regarding his testimony is an infringement on a defendant's right to
a fair trial. 79
Moreover, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
tion can be violated even if the defendant's choice as to whether to
testify is unimpaired. Since the defendant is always present at trial,
her demeanor and appearance may affect ajuror's judgment regard-
less of whether or not the defendant testifies.80 Jurors may be espe-
cially conscious of the defendant's demeanor at trial when her sanity
is at issue."' Further, evidence of mental problems can be relevant
as a mitigating factor in the sentencing stage of capital crimes.8 2
Due process does not guarantee the unfettered enjoyment of
these Sixth Amendment rights, however. The Court has indeed
"recognized that certain practices pose such a threat to the 'fairness
of the factfinding process' that they must be subjected to 'dose judi-
cial scrutiny.' "83 However, even this close scrutiny has not pre-
cluded the Court from finding essential state interests which justify
trial prejudice. In Illinois v. Allen,8 4 the Court held that the State's
interest in maintaining courtroom decorum allowed an obstreper-
ous defendant to be bound and gagged, despite the "significant ef-
fect on the jury's feelings about the defendant" which such
treatment might have.8 5 In Estelle v. Williams,8 6 however, the Court
held that a state cannot compel a defendant to be tried while wear-
ing jail clothes.8 7 The Court found no essential state interest to
weigh against the effects the clothes may have on a jury's perception
of the defendant.88 The Court acknowledged in Estelle that "the ac-
tual impact of a particular practice on the judgment ofjurors cannot
always be fully determined" but concluded that, in balancing inter-
ests, courts "must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects
of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common
79 Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972).
80 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976). Likewise, witnesses may be affected
for better or worse by the demeanor and appearance of the defendant who confronts
them. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
81 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966).
82 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
83 Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (quoting Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503-04).
84 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
85 Id. at 343-44. The Court saw binding and gagging as a last resort, to be used only
after contempt citations and removal from the courtroom failed to convince the defend-
ant to behave properly. Id. at 344-45.
86 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
87 Id. at 512. The Court did not uphold petitioner's claim, however, since he was
found to have waived his right to be tried in civilian clothes. Id. at 512-13.




Until Riggins, the Supreme Court had never considered the ef-
fects of antipsychotic drugs on a defendant's right to a fair trial. As
a general matter, the Court had held that a state has an interest in
bringing an accused to trial, but that interest is "necessarily tem-
pered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal
cases." 90 Lower courts were split on the issue of whether a state's
interest in using antipsychotics to render an accused competent to
stand trial justified compelled medication. 9 ' Most courts focused on
the ability of the drugs to enhance cognitive thought processes and
concluded that the drugs may be administered at trial as long as the
drugged defendant retains the cognitive capacity to pass the compe-
tency test. 92 To offset any prejudice caused by the effects of the
drugs on the defendants' outward appearance and demeanor, these
courts relied on testimony by experts and the defendants them-
selves to inform jurors about the effects of the drugs.93 Other
courts stressed the undesirable effects of antipsychotic drugs and
held that testimony cannot adequately substitute for a showing of
the defendant in an unmedicated condition. 9 4 In Riggins v. Nevada,
the Supreme Court addressed the effects of antipsychotic drugs on
89 Id. at 504.
90 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985) (state's interest in fair trial requires that
it provide indigent defendant with psychiatric assistance when defendant's sanity is in
question even if, as result of that assistance, state cannot bring defendant to trial be-
cause he is found incompetent); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
91 See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214
(1985) (questioning whether state interest could ever outweigh defendant's liberty inter-
est); State v. Maryott, 492 P.2d 239, 240-41 (Wash. App. 1971) (administering drugs
allows state to control defendant, thus destroying adversary process). Cf State v. Law,
244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C. 1978) (state interest in rendering accused competent to stand
trial justifies intrusion on bodily integrity).
92 See Law, 244 S.E.2d 305-07 (defendant's sanity not undermined by antipsychotic
drugs); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.H. 1978) (drugs enhanced cognitive part
of defendant's brain); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1298-99 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)
(drugs made defendant competent for trial by enhancing cognitive function); In re Pray,
336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (drug-induced competence sufficient to support finding of
competency).
93 See Law, 244 S.E.2d at 306 (jury knew defendant's calm demeanor was due to
drugs and was told of his mental state at time crime was committed);Jojola, 553 P.2d at
1300 (defendant who waived chance to present evidence of drug's effect on his de-
meanor was granted due process); Pray, 336 A.2d at 177 (failure to inform jury that
defendant's behavior was affected by drugs denied due process).
94 See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Mass. 1983) (testimony can
only offset negative influence of drugged appearance; it cannot compensate for positive
value of showing defendant's unmedicated behavior); Hayes, 389 A.2d at 1381-82 (de-
fendant entitled to show jury the state he was in when crime occurred).
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both a defendant's due process liberty interest and his right to a fair
trial.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 20, 1987, David Riggins entered Paul Wade's
apartment and remained inside for about thirty minutes.95 Shortly
after Riggins left, Wade's girlfriend found Wade's body on the floor
of his apartment. 96 An autopsy showed that Wade died from multi-
ple stab wounds to his head, chest, and back.97 Riggins was arrested
the next evening and charged with first-degree murder and robbery,
both with use of a deadly weapon.98
A few days after his incarceration, Riggins complained of hear-
ing voices in his head and having trouble sleeping.99 Riggins told
Dr. R. Edward Quass, a private psychiatrist who treated inmates at
the Clark County Jail, that Mellaril had successfully treated his
symptoms in the past.100 Dr. Quass initially prescribed 100 milli-
grams of Mellaril per day. 10 However, since Riggins' symptoms
persisted, Dr. Quass incrementally increased the dosage to 800 mil-
ligrams per day. 0 2
InJanuary 1988, Riggins sought a determination of his compe-
tence to stand trial.' 03 Three court-appointed psychiatrists ex-
amined Riggins during February and March, while he was receiving
450 milligrams of Mellaril per day. 10 4 Dr. William O'Gorman and
Dr. Franklin Master stated that Riggins was competent to stand trial,
while Dr. Jack Jurasky determined that Riggins was incompetent. 0 5
The Clark County District Court concluded that Riggins was legally
sane and competent to stand trial.106
In June 1988, the defense filed a motion to terminate the ad-
ministration of Mellaril during Riggins' trial.'0 7 Riggins' twofold ar-
gument relied on the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
95 Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 537 (Nev. 1991).
96 Id
97 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1812 (1992).
98 Riggins, 808 P.2d at 537.
99 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
100 Id.
101 Id.





107 Id. Riggins also moved to be taken off Dilantin. Id.
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Amendment and the Nevada Constitution.10 8 Riggins initially ar-
gued that the effects of the drugs on his demeanor and mental state
during trial would infringe upon his freedom and deny him due pro-
cess.' 0 9 Riggins' second argument was that he had a right to show
jurors his true mental state in support of his insanity defense at
trial."i 0 The state responded that since Nevada law prohibits the
trial of incompetent defendants, II the court could order Riggins to
take whatever medicine was necessary to ensure his competence." 12
An evidentiary hearing on Riggins' motion was held on July 14,
1988.113 By this time, Riggins was receiving the maximum dose of
800 milligrams of Mellaril each day. 1 4 At this hearing, each of the
four psychiatrists who had examined Riggins held a different opin-
ion as to the effects of withdrawing the medication. Dr. Master be-
lieved that Riggins would be competent to stand trial even without
Mellaril, and his behavior would not noticeably be altered. 115 Dr.
Quass agreed that Riggins would be competent without Mellaril, but
he testified that jurors would not notice the effects of the drug if it
were continued. 1 6 Dr. O'Gorman, however, stated that Mellaril
made Riggins calmer and more relaxed and that the high dose he
was receiving could make him drowsy; Dr. O'Gorman was unable to
predict the effects of withdrawing Mellaril.11 7 Dr. Jurasky again con-
cluded that Riggins was incompetent even while on Mellaril and
warned the court that taking Riggins off the drug would cause him
to regress into a manifest psychosis." 18
The district court denied Riggins' motion without explaining its
rationale or resolving the conflicting expert testimony. 119 Riggins
continued to receive the maximum dosage of Mellaril each day
through the end of his trial in November 1988.120
At his trial Riggins presented an insanity defense.121 Testifying
on his own behalf, Riggins admitted that he used cocaine prior to
108 Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also supra part
II.B. (discussing due process analysis).
109 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1812 (1992).
110 Id.
III NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.400 (1989).
112 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
113 Id. at 1813.
114 Id. at 1812-13. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.









entering Wade's apartment and that he fought with Wade. 122 How-
ever, Riggins testified that Wade was trying to kill him and that
voices in his head told him that killing Wade would be justifiable
homicide. 123 A jury found Riggins guilty of murder and robbery,
both with use of a deadly weapon, and sentenced Riggins to
death. 124
On appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, Riggins claimed,
among other things, that the forced administration of Mellaril vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to a full and fair trial by preventing
him from assisting in his own defense and by prejudicially affecting
his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial. 125 Riggins argued
that this prejudice was unjustified since the state never demon-
strated a need to have Riggins on Mellaril and never explored less
intrusive alternatives to administering the maximum dose of 800
milligram per day. 126
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins' conviction and
sentence. 127 The court concluded that Riggins' demeanor was rele-
vant to his insanity defense, but found that there was sufficient ex-
pert testimony at trial to inform the jury of the effects Mellaril had
on Riggins' demeanor.1 28 Thus, the court held that the denial of
Riggins' motion to terminate his medication was neither an abuse of
the trial court's discretion nor a violation of Riggins' Sixth Amend-
ment rights. 129 In a concurring opinion, Justice Rose stated that
prior to forcing Riggins to take the drug, the lower court should
have determined whether Riggins truly needed to be on Mellaril and
whether he could function adequately without the drug. 30 Never-
theless, Justice Rose concluded, based on the entire record, that
Riggins received a fair trial.13 ' Justice Springer argued vigorously
in dissent that a defendant may never be forced to take antipsychotic
drugs simply so the state can bring him to trial.' 3 2
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 33




125 Id-; see also Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 537 (Nev. 1991).
126 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
127 Riggins, 808 P.2d at 539.
128 Id. at 537-38.
129 Id. at 538.
130 Id. at 539-40 (Rose, J., concurring).
131 Id- at 539-40 (Rose, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 541 (Springer, J., dissenting).
133 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 49 (1991).
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drugs during trial violates rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments.13 4
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision
of the Nevada Supreme Court and remanded the case for further
consideration.13 5 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor'3 6
held that the lower courts erroneously failed to consider Riggins'
liberty interest in freedom from antipsychotic drugs when deciding
to medicate him against his will.' 37 The majority concluded that
since this error may have unjustly prejudiced Riggins' trial, his con-
viction should be reversed and reconsidered.' 38
The key part of the majority's opinion is the Court's decision to
extend the holding in Washington v. Harper to pretrial detainees. 39
Justice O'Connor quoted at length from the Harper opinion in cata-
loging the potential side effects of antipsychotic drugs and reiter-
ated that the forced administration of the drugs is a "particularly
severe" interference with a person's liberty.140 The Court then held
that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much protec-
tion to persons the state detains for trial" as it does to convicted
prisoners. 141
The majority never decided how much more protection, if any,
detainees are entitled to than prisoners because Nevada failed to
provide even the minimum protections prescribed by Harper. As
Justice O'Connor stated, "Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs
on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overrid-
ing justification and a determination of medical appropriate-
134 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
135 Id. at 1817.
136 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist, and Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined.
137 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816. Both parties indicated that after Riggins' motion to
terminate the use of Mellaril was denied, further administration of the drug was involun-
tary. Id. at 1816. UnlikeJustice Thomas, the majority accepted this assumption and did
not address whether the medication was truly forced on Riggins. See infra note 198 for
Justice Thomas' dissenting view.
i38 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816-17.
I39 Id. at 1814-15. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Washington v. Harper.
140 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229
(1990)).
141 Id. at 1815 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)).
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ness."' 142 Thus, even under the standard used for prisoners, "once
Riggins moved to terminate... medication, the State became obli-
gated to establish the need for Mellaril and the medical appropriate-
ness of the drug." 143 The majority presumed that Mellaril was
medically appropriate since Riggins never argued otherwise,
although they noted that Riggins received a very high dose.144 Rig-
gins' rights were unjustifiably violated, though, when the trial court
"allowed administration of Mellaril to continue without making any
determination of the need for this course."' 45
Since there was no finding that any State need outweighed Rig-
gins' liberty, the majority did not have to decide what substantive
standards should be used for judging cases involving forcibly medi-
cated pretrial detainees or defendants.146 The majority did con-
clude that due process would have been satisfied if Nevada had
shown that Mellaril was medically appropriate, essential for Riggins'
safety or the safety of others, and the least intrusive means to
achieve these state interests.1 47 The majority also acknowledged
that "other compelling concerns," besides safety, could be found to
outweigh the interest of an accused.' 48 The majority rejected the
dissent's assertion that, by mentioning a compelling state interest
and the least intrusive means to achieve that interest, they had aban-
doned Harper's standard of asking only whether a restriction is rea-
sonably related to a legitimate state interest. 49 Justice O'Connor
explicitly denied adopting a standard of strict scrutiny and stated
that there was simply "no occasion to finally prescribe such substan-
tive standards."' 5 0 The majority held only that the trial court erred
by failing to consider Riggins' liberty interest; hence, the Nevada
Supreme Court should have overturned the verdict.' 5'
The majority concluded that this was reversible error since
there was a strong possibility that Mellaril influenced the outcome
of Riggins' trial. Justice O'Connor cited the testimony of Dr.
142 Id at 1815.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1814, 1816.
145 Id at 1815-16.
146 Id. at 1815.
147 Id
148 Id. at 1816.
149 See id- at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the majority's
use of terms such as "compelling state interest," and "less intrusive alternatives" im-
poses a greater burden on states than Harper's reasonableness standard. See infra notes
207-12 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas' opinion). See also supra text
accompanying note 56 (summarizing the standard of review used in Harper).
150 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
151 Id. at 1816-17.
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O'Gorman and Dr. Master, who agreed that the high dose of Mel-
laril given to Riggins could cause side effects such as tension, drow-
siness, or confusion. 152 She concluded that "[i]t is clearly possible
that such side effects impacted not just Riggins' outward appear-
ance, but also the content of his testimony on direct or cross-exami-
nation, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his
communication with counsel."' 5 3 The majority held that Riggins
did not have to prove actual prejudice because the precise effects of
the drugs on Riggins and the jury are "purely speculative."' 54
Rather, once Riggins proved a "strong possibility" of prejudice, the
State assumed the burden of proving either that this prejudice did
not exist or that it was justified by "an essential state interest."' 55
The majority held that Nevada failed to prove either the lack of
prejudice or an essential state interest. Justice O'Connor believed
that even if the Nevada Supreme Court was correct in its belief that
expert testimony allowed the jurors to assess fairly Riggins' de-
meanor at trial, an unacceptable risk of prejudice remained. 156 Ex-
pert testimony "did nothing to cure the possibility that the
substance of his own testimony, his interaction with counsel, or his
comprehension at trial were compromised by forced administration
of Mellaril."' 157 Justice O'Connor did recognize a state interest in
bringing an accused to trial. ' 58 However, the trial court never found
that Mellaril was necessary to ensure Riggins' competence, and the
testimony did not support such a conclusion.' 59 The majority re-
fused to speculate whether a defendant's interests would still out-
weigh the state's if the medicine is needed to render the defendant
competent for trial. ' 60 The majority concluded that since the record
revealed nothing to prove that essential state interests required the
forced administration of Mellaril, the potential for prejudice caused
by the drug was unjustified. 61
B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority's holding but criti-
152 Id. at 1816.
155 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1816-17 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986); Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976)).
156 Id. at 1816.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1815 (citing Allen, 397 U.S. at 347 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
159 Id. at 1815-16.
160 Id. at 1815.
161 Id. at 1817.
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cizedJustice O'Connor for failing to prescribe substantive standards
to guide the trial court when it considered the case on remand.' 62
Justice Kennedy agreed that Riggins had a liberty interest in being
free from antipsychotic drugs. 163 Justice Kennedy would have pro-
ceeded, however, to establish standards which afford greater protec-
tion to pretrial detainees than to convicted prisoners.
Justice Kennedy saw a fundamental difference between Harper
and Riggins. He distinguished between a prison situation, in which
medicine is given to ensure that a prisoner functions in a non-vio-
lent way, and a trial situation, where "the avowed purpose of the
medication is not functional competence, but competence to stand
trial."'164 In prison situations, an objective determination can be
made as to whether an inmate's behavior complies with minimum
standards. 165 When competency to stand trial is at issue, however, a
subjective determination of a defendant's capacity must be made. 166
Given the interests at stake in a criminal proceeding, Justice Ken-
nedy would "require the State in every case to make a showing that
there is no significant risk that the mediction will impair or alter in
any material way the defendant's capacity or willingness to react to
the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel."' 167
Justice Kennedy expressed skepticism that a state could ever
make a showing that would justify forced medication because of the
inherent risks of antipsychotic drugs.' 68 He identified two principal
ways in which the drugs prejudice the accused. Initially, the ac-
cused's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment are implicated because the drugs affect the accused's
demeanor both on the witness stand and in the courtroom.' 69 Jus-
tice Kennedy reviewed the potential side effects of antipsychotic
drugs and concluded that the drugs "may alter demeanor in a way
that will prejudice all facets of the defense."' 170 He noted that the
prejudice can be especially acute during sentencing, when the jury
''must attempt to know the heart and mind of the offender and
judge his character." 171 In a capital case, the jury's character assess-
162 Id- at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164 It- at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166 It (Kennedy, J., concurring).
167 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
168 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). justice Kennedy noted that determining the effects
ofantipsychotic drugs is itself an elusive inquiry since experts may not be able to discern
a baseline normality for each defendant. Id.
169 I. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
170 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ment may determine whether the defendant lives or dies.1 72
Justice Kennedy also argued that antispychotic drugs can preju-
dice the accused by interfering with the attorney-client relationship.
The side effects of the drugs can prevent "effective communication"
and make the defendant "less able or willing to take part in his de-
fense." 173 Justice Kennedy believed antipsychotic drugs could be
prescribed "for the very purpose of imposing constraints on the de-
fendant's own will." 174 He observed that it is the accused, rather
than her attorney, who has the right to conduct her own defense. 175
Any interference with the accused's ability or will to defend herself,
or the manner in which she does so, is comparable to the manipula-
tion of evidence by the State.' 76 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded
that "absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process
Clause prohibits prosecuting officials from administering involun-
tary doses of antipsychotic medicines."' 177
According to Justice Kennedy, if a state cannot make such a
showing, it must resort to civil commitment unless the accused is
competent to stand trial without the drugs. Justice Kennedy recog-
nized that a state has an interest in rendering the accused competent
to stand trial, 178 but "[ilf the defendant cannot be tried without his
demeanor being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treat-
ment, in my view the Constitution requires that society bear this cost
[of civil commitment]."' 179 Justice Kennedy left open the possibility
that scientific advances would eventually produce "effective" drugs
that have "only minimal side effects."' 80 Until such drugs evolve,
however, Justice Kennedy would permit compulsory drugging "only
when the State can show that involuntary treatment does not cause
alterations raising the concerns enumerated in this separate
opinion."'81
172 Id. at 1819-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 (1975)).
175 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 1817-18 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to accused by prosecution violates due
process)).
177 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
178 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
180 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent, Justice Thomas18 2 argued that the ma-
jority conflated two distinct questions. Justice Thomas thought the
question of whether the forced administration of Mellaril deprived
Riggins of a protected liberty interest is distinct from the question
of whether Riggins had a fundamentally fair trial.183 In a criminal
case, Riggins can ask only that his conviction and sentence be over-
turned; he may not seek civil damages or an injunction to remedy an
interference with his personal liberty.' 8 4 The dissent concluded that
since Riggins' trial was fundamentally fair, his conviction should not
be overturned.' 8 5 Justice Thomas would have held that the Nevada
Supreme Court properly rejected both Riggins' arguments as to why
his cause was prejudiced.
Riggins first claimed that he was wrongly precluded at trial
from presenting relevant evidence of his demeanor at the time he
killed Wade.18 6 Justice Thomas noted that the Supreme Court can-
not determine the admissibility of evidence in state courts and may
reverse a trial judge's evidentiary ruling only if it "so infuses the
trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law."' 187 Since the
majority only speculated, and never actually found, that Riggins suf-
fered side effects which would be noticeable to a jury, it was im-
proper for them to reverse the trial court's judgment.18 8
Justice Thomas argued further that even if Riggins' demeanor
was noticeably altered by the drug, his trial was not inherently un-
fair. Justice Thomas noted that the trial court allowed Riggins "to
prove his mental condition as it existed at the time of the crime
through testimony instead of his appearance in court in an unmedi-
cated condition."' 18 9 Riggins testified himself about the effects of
Mellaril on his demeanor and called Dr. Jurasky to testify about his
mental state prior to medication. 190 Since several state courts have
agreed that testimony at trial suffices to inform the jury of the effects
of antipsychotic drugs, Justice Thomas saw no reason why excluding
evidence of Riggins' unmedicated demeanor rendered the trial fun-
182 Justice Scaliajoinedjustice Thomas' opinion except as to Part II-A, the portion of
the dissent that argues Mellaril was not forced on Riggins.
183 Riggins,, 112 S. Ct. at 1821 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228
(1941)).
188 Id. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).




Justice Thomas also rejected Riggins' claim that his trial was
prejudiced because Mellaril interfered with his ability to participate
in his defense. Justice Thomas recognized that the conviction of a
legally incompetent person violates due process.192 However, Jus-
tice Thomas stressed that the trial court had specifically found Rig-
gins competent while he was taking Mellaril under a statute
requiring him to have the mental capacity to aid in his defense and
understand the nature of the charges against him. 193 This finding of
competence created a presumption that Riggins could have a fair
trial, which Riggins failed to overcome by showing specific ways in
which he could not participate in his defense. 94 Moreover, argued
Justice Thomas, Dr. Quass, and Dr. O'Gorman both believed Mel-
laril helped Riggins by increasing his cognitive capacity.' 95 The dis-
sent concluded that the record "does not even support [Riggins']
assertion that Mellaril made him worse off" at trial. 196
The dissent next argued that Riggins' liberty interest in avoid-
ing unwanted antipsychotic drugs is an improper basis for reversing
Riggins' criminal conviction. In the portion of his opinion in which
Justice Scalia did not join, Justice Thomas identified three reasons
why the Court should never have considered the question of
whether Riggins had a substantive liberty interest under Washington
v. Harper.197
Initially, Justice Thomas expressed doubt that Riggins was
medicated against his will. Riggins took Mellaril voluntarily after his
arrest and, although the court refused to enjoin further treatment in
response to Riggins' motion, "it did not order him to take any medi-
cation."' 9 8 Justice Thomas next stated that Riggins cannot com-
191 Id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citing State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 306 (S.C. 1978);
State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. 1976); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt.
1975)).
192 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966)).
193 Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.400(2) (1989).
This statute requires the same elements to prove competence as the Supreme Court
required in Dusky v. United States. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
194 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1823 (Thomas,J., dissenting) (citingJojola, 553 P.2d at 1299).
195 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
197 Id. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas criticized the majority for assuming,
simply because the Nevada Supreme Court did, that State physicians forcibly drugged
Riggins. "The Nevada Supreme Court . . .may have made its assumption [that the
medication was involuntary] for the purpose of argument; the assumption, in its view,
did not change the result of the case. The Court cannot make the same assumption if it
requires reversal of Riggins' conviction." Id. at 1824 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra
note 137 forJustice O'Connor's response to this argument.
858 [Vol. 83
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DR UGS
plain about a violation of his liberty because he argued below for
reversal of his conviction only on the ground that he was denied a
fair trial. 199 Finally, Justice Thomas would not have considered the
Harper issue because the Court granted certiorari to decide whether
Riggins was denied a fair trial, and not to determine whether Rig-
gins had a liberty interest in being free from unwanted antipsychotic
drugs.200 Justice Thomas noted that the Court does not ordinarily
consider issues that were not raised below or were not included in
the petition for certiorari.201
Justice Scalia joined in Justice Thomas' further conclusion that
even if the Harper issue is considered, it did not warrant the reversal
of Riggins' conviction. The dissent agreed that a pretrial detainee
has at least the same liberty as the inmate in Harper.20 2 However,
the dissent pointed out that Harper sought only civil damages and
injunctive relief against future medication. 205 "Even if Nevada
failed to make the findings necessary to support forced administra-
tion of Mellaril, this failure, without more, would not constitute a
trial error or a flaw in the trial mechanism." 20 4 Thus, the dissent
argued, even if Riggins' liberty was unjustly violated, he was limited
to civil remedies unless he showed that his trial was actually
prejudiced. 20 5 Justice Thomas demonstrated the need for actual
prejudice through an analogy: "[T]he Court surely would not re-
verse a criminal conviction for a Harper violation involving medica-
tions such as penicillin," yet "we have no indication in this case...
that Mellaril unfairly prejudiced Riggins." 206
Since the dissent believed Riggins received a fair trial, it was not
necessary for Justice Thomas to define the precise standards to be
used in judging when medication may be compelled. However, the
Court's discussion of these standards troubled Justice Thomas. The
dissent chastised the majority for purporting to rely on Harper while
applying standards that differed substantially from Harper's.20 7 Jus-
tice Thomas conceded that "the standards for forcibly medicating
inmates may well differ from those for persons awaiting trial."' 208
199 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1824 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 1824 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 1824 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522,
1531-32 (1992)).
202 Id. at 1824-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203 Id. at 1825 (Thomas,J., dissenting). See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
217 (1990).
204 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1825 (ThomasJ., dissenting).
205 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206 Id at 1825-26 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
207 Id. at 1826 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
208 Id. (ThomasJ., dissenting).
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He stressed, though, that the Harper Court struck down the lower
court's holding that a compelling state interest was required to jus-
tify involuntary medication. 20 9 Instead, the Supreme Court in
Harper held that the standard of reasonableness should apply and
that the existence of less intrusive means of accommodating the
state's interest does not invalidate the state's policy. 210 Since the
Riggins' majority faulted the trial court for failing to find that "com-
pelling concerns" outweighed Riggins' liberty interest and for not
contemplating "less intrusive alternatives," 21' the dissent concluded
that the majority adopted "a standard of strict scrutiny." 21 2
V. ANALYSIS
According to this Note, the Riggins Court correctly recognized
that a pretrial detainee has a liberty interest in freedom from un-
wanted antipsychotic drugs. While the Court's restraint prevented
it from dictating the degree of protection that this liberty interest
deserves, this Note argues that the Court's opinion should be inter-
preted as requiring strict scrutiny of any decision to administer an-
tipsychotic drugs against a detainee's will. This Note also argues
that the Court erroneously equated the risk of harmful side effects
with the risk of trial prejudice. While the potential adverse effects of
antipsychotic drugs certainly must be considered when prospec-
tively deciding to medicate a pretrial detainee, the risk alone of side
effects that never manifest themselves at trial has no effect on the
fairness of a verdict. A careful assessment of the effects of these
drugs should have led the Court to require a showing that the drugs
actually prejudiced a defendant's trial before reversing a criminal
conviction.
A. THE RISKS OF ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS JUSTIFY STRICT SCRUTINY
All nine Justices agreed in Riggins that the liberty interest recog-
nized in Washington v. Harper extends to pretrial detainees and must
be considered when a state seeks to compel antipsychotic medica-
tion. 213 This holding was clearly mandated by Bell v. Wolfish, in
which the Court held that pretrial detainees enjoy at least as many
209 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 218
(1990)).
210 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Harper, 494 U.S. at 223, 226).
211 Id. (Thomas,J., dissenting) (emphasis added by justice Thomas) (quoting the ma-
jority opinion at 1815-16).
212 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).




rights as convicted prisoners.21 4 Since the trial court never consid-
ered this interest, the Supreme Court could have decided the case
on these narrow grounds and left it to the trial court to consider on
remand how much protection Riggins' liberty interest deserved. 215
Although the Court explicitly declined to adopt a standard of strict
scrutiny, Justice Thomas correctly perceived that the effect of the
majority's analysis was to do just that. 216
There are many indications that if the Supreme Court had de-
cided the issue in Riggins, it would have required strict scrutiny in
cases involving pretrial detainees. As Justice Thomas argued, the
majority used the terms of strict scrutiny which were rejected in
Harper.2 17 The only substantive standard announced by Justice
O'Connor was that due process would have been satisfied if the
drugs were medically appropriate and "the least intrusive means" pos-
sible to protect the safety of Riggins or other inmates.2 18 Justice
O'Connor also stated that the trial court could weigh safety or "other
compelling concerns" against Riggins' liberty interest.2 19 Justice
O'Connor made no attempt to apply the terms of the reasonable-
ness standard, or any other, to facts involving pretrial detainees, and
she explicitly noted that the "unique circumstances of penal con-
finement" involved in Harper were not present in Riggins.220
Further, Justice Kennedy, the author of the Harper opinion, in-
sisted that Riggins "is not a case like Washington v. Harper" and
doubted whether a state could show a compelling enough interest to
justify medicating a pretrial detainee. 22' Indeed, a standard requir-
ing strict scrutiny of a decision to medicate pretrial detainees is not
at all inconsistent with Harper. The Harper Court rejected the com-
pelling state interest requirement only because of the unique state
interests involved in prison situtions. 222 The Harper Court stressed
that these state interests often justify the reasonableness standard
even when the regulation infringes on interests that are protected
by strict scrutiny in non-prison settings. 223
214 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
218 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1815 (1992) (emphasis added).
219 Id. at 1816 (emphasis added).
220 Id. at 1815.
221 Id at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). See also supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
223 Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349
(1987)). See also supra note 55.
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Finally, even Justice Thomas never advocated the application of
Harper's reasonableness standard to persons awaiting trial. Indeed,
he faulted the Court only for failing to announce and justify what he
saw as a clear departure from Harper.224 The fact that the majority
did not adopt this strict standard of review is more an indication of
the Court's judicial restraint than of their disagreement with the
standard.225 One lower court judge has already agreed with this
analysis and concluded that "[t]here is no principled way, after Rig-
gins, that the trial court on remand can revert to Harper's 'reasona-
bleness' test."226
To the extent that the Court's opinion can be interpreted as
requiring strict scrutiny, the Court properly judged the intrusive-
ness of unwanted antipsychotic drugs on a person's liberty. The
Court correctly based its assessment of Riggins' liberty interest on
the risks posed by antipsychotics at the time the decision to medi-
cate was made, rather than on the effects that Riggins actually suf-
fered after medication began. Justice O'Connor quoted Harper's
conclusion that the risks of acute dystonia, akathisia, neuroleptic
malignant syndrome, and tardive dyskinesia represent a "substantial
interference with a person's liberty." 227 The Court failed to note
that Mellaril is the antipsychotic agent least likely to cause these
neurological side effects. 228 As the Harper opinion pointed out,
however, even if an operation is very likely to be successful, a state
cannot compel a person to undergo surgery against her will.229 The
forcible administration of even a harmless drug like aspirin intrudes
upon a person's liberty and bodily autonomy,230 but her interest in
protecting that liberty increases in proportion to the adverse effects
that intrusion could have on her well-being. A person should not
have to suffer serious side effects or death from a medication before
being able to assert her interest in avoiding those risks. In Riggins,
the Court properly concluded that the risks alone of antipsychotic
224 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1826 (Thomas,J., dissenting). See also supra notes 207-12 and
accompanying text.
225 See Kheim v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 175 (D.C. 1992) (Ferren,J., dissenting
from decision to deny rehearing en banc).
226 Id.
227 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-15 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30). See supra text
accompanying notes 28-38 for a discussion of these side effects.
228 See supra notes 21, 28-38 and accompanying text.
229 Washingon v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753 (1985)).
230 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1826 (Thomas,J., dissenting). See also Cruzan v. Director,




drugs to a patient's health were great enough to warrant substantial
due process protection, arguably even strict scrutiny.
B. ACTUAL PREJUDICE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMPLICATE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The Riggins Court correctly recognized that antipsychotic drugs
can interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court fo-
cused not on the threshold issue of competency to stand trial, but
on the effects of Mellaril on Riggins' demeanor and appearance at
trial and on his ability to assist in his defense. 231 The majority wor-
ried that the high dosage Riggins was taking would make him "up-
tight" and that the sedation effect of Mellaril could be "severe
enough to affect thought processes." 232 The majority concluded
that these effects could have impacted Riggins' appearance, as well
as the content of his testimony and his ability to assist his lawyer in
his defense.233 Justice Kennedy agreed that the symptoms of akathi-
sia, parkinsonism, and sedation may prejudice a defendant's trial by
altering his demeanor and rendering him unable or unwilling to as-
sist his attorney in his defense. 234
While these side effects certainly have the potential to prejudice
a trial, the risk that the drugs will cause an unfair trial is not a harm
in and of itself. Unlike the act of forcing a person to consume drugs,
which is inherently a violation of that person's liberty even if no ad-
verse effects occur,235 trial prejudice may be proven and remedied
if, and when, it occurs. There is a risk that any trial will be
prejudiced by any number of factors. For example, a defendant
forced to take antihistamines may feel drowsy, but the risk of trial
prejudice from that intrusion on the defendant's liberty is negligi-
ble.236 If unwanted antipsychotic drugs could help, or at least not
impair, a person's defense, his interest in a fair trial would not be
infringed.
Nevertheless, the majority held that a showing of a strong pos-
sibility of prejudice is sufficient to justify the reversal of a criminal
conviction. 237 Justice O'Connor cited Estelle v. Williams in support of
the proposition that the risk of trial prejudice is enough to justify
231 See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
232 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1818-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra text accompanying notes 22-34
for a discussion of these side effects.
235 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
236 Justice Thomas made a similar analogy to penicillin and aspirin in his dissent. Rig-
gins, 112 S. Ct. at 1825-26.
237 Id. at 1816.
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reversal. 238 In Williams, the Court held that even though the precise
consequences of compelling a defendant to wear prison clothes at
trial could not be determined, there was enough probability of un-
fair prejudice that a reversal was justified. 23 9 The Court failed, how-
ever, to notice the distinction between Riggins and Williams. In
Williams, there was no doubt that the defendant was wearing prison
clothes, and the only uncertainty was the effect the clothes would
have on jurors' perceptions; in Riggins, the existence of the poten-
tially biasing influence was uncertain, as well as the effect that influ-
ence might have on the jury's verdict. When there is an inherent
risk of the existence of a biasing influence, this holding places an
impossibly high, and needless, burden on the states to disprove the
risk of prejudice in order to justify forced medication.
Indeed, substantial doubt existed as to whether Riggins suf-
fered from any side effects during his trial. Riggins claimed he was
drowsy during trial, and some of the psychiatric evidence supported
that contention. 240 As Justice Thomas pointed out, however, Dr.
Quass and Dr. O'Gorman both testified that Mellaril was helpful to
Riggins and may have increased his cognitive capacity. 241 Justice
O'Connor's opinion all but ignores the very real possibility that
Mellaril performed as intended and enhanced Riggins' cognitive
abilities by clearing his delusions.242 The majority also ignored the
fact that there are many ways of ensuring the fairness of a trial, even
if the defendant suffers from some of the side effects of antip-
sychotic drugs.
First, the Court failed to emphasize that harmful side effects are
relatively rare and, even when they do occur, can often be cured or
treated to reduce the adverse effects. 243 In addition, patients often
develop tolerances to the sedative effect of the drugs. 244
Second, since most side effects can be objectively diagnosed, a
defendant will be able either to demonstrate the effects or have
them diagnosed by an expert. Once such a side effect manifests it-
self, its potential effect on the fairness of the trial can be considered
by the court.245 It must be presumed that Riggins suffered only
238 Id.
239 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976).
240 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring). One of Riggins' doctors
testified that Riggins' dose of 800 milligrams was enough to "tranquilize an elephant."
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
241 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
242 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
243 See supra part II.A for a discussion of the side effects of antipsychotic drugs.
244 See supra part II.A.
245 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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from less obvious effects than, for example, tardive dyskinesia or
seizures, since he based his appeal only on drowsiness.
Third, experts and the defendant himself can inform the jury
about the more subtle effects of antipsychotic drugs.246 Justice
Thomas agreed with the Nevada Supreme Court and several other
courts that have considered the issue that expert testimony suffices
to clarify the effects of the drug for thejury.247 The majority did not
deny that such testimony may allow jurors to properly assess the
drug's impact on a defendant's outward appearance and behavior.
The only reason the majority gave for rejecting the notion that testi-
mony can correct for the effects of antipsychotic drugs at trial was
that such testimony cannot offset the effects on the defendant's cog-
nitive processes. 248 The majority is certainly correct that testimony
alone cannot account for all the effects of antipsychotic drugs.
The majority's conclusion, however, ignored the fact that a de-
fendant on antipsychotic drugs must still be found competent to
stand trial. 249 The test to determine competency specifically deter-
mines if the defendant has the cognitive capability to consult with
her lawyer and follow the proceedings against her-the very abilities
the Court believed could be affected by antipsychotic drugs. 250 The
majority never mentioned that Riggins was receiving the maximum
dose of 800 milligrams of Mellaril during his trial, despite the fact
that he had been found competent to stand trial while taking only
450 milligrams per day.251 IfJustice O'Connor's speculation is cor-
rect that large doses caused drowsiness to the extent of inhibiting
cognitive functions, 252 Riggins' interests could have been protected
by requesting a competency determination at the time of trial. If
Riggins had been found competent while taking 800 milligrams, he
should have been presumed to have sufficient cognitive capacity to
consult with counsel and testify in his own behalf. Expert testimony,
as well as the testimony of Riggins himself, could have informed the
jury of any changes in Riggins' demeanor as a result of the drug,
and the potential for bias would have been eliminated.
As the dissent argued, the Court should have required a show-
ing of actual prejudice before reversing Riggins' conviction.253
246 Several courts have so held. See supra note 93.
247 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1822 (1992) (ThomasJ., dissenting) (quoting
cases cited supra note 93).
248 Id. at 1816.
249 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
250 See supra text accompanying note 70.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 104, 114.
252 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
253 Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810, 1825 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Under Williams, if Riggins proved the drugs actually affected his de-
meanor at trial, a reversal would be justified even if the exact effect
of the prejudice to Riggins' demeanor on the jury could not be de-
termined. 254 The Court purported to follow Williams, but it did not
find that Riggins actually suffered adverse effects from the drugs at
trial.255 Since the majority may well have been willing to make such
a finding, it is not apparent that this standard would have led to a
different outcome in Riggins. However, it would have provided bet-
ter guidance to lower courts in similar cases in the future.
A state's compelling interests in medicating a pretrial detainee
can best be protected by the actual prejudice standard. This Note
argues that, after Riggins, a state must demonstrate a compelling
state interest in administering antipsychotic medication before in-
fringing on a detainee's liberty interest. 256 If a state makes a strong
enough case for medication to survive strict scrutiny, it should not
later have the nearly impossible burden of disproving the existence
of all the possible side effects of antipsychotic drugs. If the state has
the burden of proof, a defendant could allege that she suffered from
side effects that really never occurred, or at least which she could
not prove if she had the burden of proof. Instead, a state should
only have to demonstrate that the defendant had a fair trial. A stan-
dard that requires defendants to prove they were actually prejudiced
by the effects of an unwanted drug encourages defendants to specify
the side effects from which they suffer. Treatment can then be ob-
tained, or testimony offered, to mitigate the effects of the drugs on a
defendant's trial. Once a state shows an interest compelling enough
to justify forcible medication, the state should be entitled to the
benefits of antipsychotic drugs unless the defendant is incompetent
or so afflicted by side effects that her trial cannot be made fair.
VI. CONCLUSION
It remains to be determined what degree of protection courts
will afford to the liberty interest of a pretrial detainee in being free
from unwanted antipsychotic drugs. If courts apply a standard of
strict scrutiny, as this Note argues they should, the question after
Riggins becomes: What state interests are sufficiently compelling to
outweigh a detainee's liberty interest? Since the Court mentioned
prison safety and security concerns as compelling state interests, the
key issue left to be determined is whether a state's interest in ren-
254 See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
256 See supra part V.A.
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dering an accused competent to stand trial is sufficient tojustify the
forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs.257
The prime value of antipsychotic drugs to states in criminal
proceedings is their ability to render an otherwise incompetent de-
fendant competent to stand trial. However, if a defendant's compe-
tence depends on continued antipsychotic medication, the state's
interest in bringing the accused to trial comes into direct conflict
with the accused's liberty interest. After Riggins, the Court would
probably hold that a detainee's liberty interest outweighs the state's
desire to medicate. The State's true interest is not just in a trial, but
in a fair trial.258 Given the majority's fear of the risks of antip-
sychotic drugs and Justice Kennedy's desire to hold that the the
drugs are inherently prejudicial at trial, it seems likely that the Court
would not allow an accused to be rendered "artificially compe-
tent"259 to stand trial unless an outstanding, and maybe impossible,
showing of need and the lack of prejudice were made by the State.
Since there are many non-prejudicial ways to account for the effects
of antipsychotic drugs at trial, this Note concludes that such a hold-
ing would unjustifiably prevent states from realizing the remarkable
benefits of antipsychotic drugs.
WILLIAM P. ZIEGELMUELLER
257 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that this question was posed, but not answered,
by the Court's holding in Riggins. See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
258 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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